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Case and C om m ent
CO M BE v. CO M BE (1951) 1 ALL E.R. 767
C O N T R A C T  -  “PROM ISSORY ESTOPPEL" -  PRO M ISE M ADE 
AND A CTED  UPON -  ABSENCE O F CO N SID ER A TIO N
T he much discussed principle enunciated by Mr. Justice Denn­
ing (as he then was) in Central London Property Trust, Ltd. v. High 
Trees House. Ltd., (1947) K.B. H 6 , has been greatly clarified as a result 
of the decision in this ease. T he so-called “High Trees doctrine*' 
stated that when a party makes a promise intended to be acted upon, 
and which is in fact actcd upon by the promisee to his detriment, 
the promisor shall be held to nis promise even in the absence of con­
sideration; consideration would be lacking in such a case if the detri­
ment were not incurred at the express or implied request of the prom­
isor. There was the further requirement that the parties must have 
intended to create legal relations. After Mr. Justice Denning’s decis­
ions in Robertson v. Minister of Pensions, (194S) 2 ALL E.R. 767, 
and Bob Guincss. Ltd. v. Salomonscn, (1948) 2 K.B. 42, there was 
a tendency to regard this doctrine as creating a new cause of action. 
'The Combe case makes it clear that the principle has a much more 
limited application.
A wife, petitioner in divorce proceedings, gave instructions to 
her solicitors to apply for an order for permanent maintenance in the 
event of a dccrcc nisi being granted to her. On Feb. 1, 194"> the 
decree nisi was granted, and on Feb. 9, 194^. the wife’s solicitors wrote 
to the husband s solicitors asking them to confirm, that with respect 
to permanent maintenance the husband was prepared to make the 
wife an allowance of LlOO a year income tax free. The husband agreed 
through his solicitors to allow her this sum. The decree absolute was 
made on Aug. 11, 1943. The husband failed to make the agreed pay­
ments, but his wife, knowing he was not in a good financial position, 
refrained from applying to the court for an order for permanent main­
tenance. However, in 19S0, the wife brought an action against the 
husband claiming the amount of the arrears on the ground that she was 
entitled to them under the husband’s promise.
The action was tried bv Bvrnc, J. The defendant (husband) 
contended that the agreement was unenforceable because there was 
no consideration for the promise. Plaintiff’s counsel took the position 
that a promise was made bv the husband for the purpose of making 
an arrangement about maintenance, that he intended to be bound 
bv it and knew that it was going to be acted upon bv the wife, and 
that the wife did act on it. \ l r .  Justice Byrne accepted this argument
I Ik defendant s appeal was heard b\ a Court of Appeal includ­
ing Lord J’lsiiec Penning. I 11e\ icvcrsed the judgment or the Court 
below, cxpl.nihiig and distinguishing the High trees ease; the\ held 
that since tlicic was no proof that the husband had requested the wife 
to forbear from apphing to the Courts for inaiutenanec, there was no 
consideration foi Ins promise which was therefore unenforeable.
Perhaps the most interesting feature of this ease* is the fact that 
Henning L.J., onlv two and one-halt vcars after 11is decision in Robert­
son v. Minister of Pensions (supra) and within four years of the High 
Trees case, found it necessary to explain these cases. The principle 
he had cmmieatcd was not on its face easiK reconcilable with the 
generally accepted view on the law of consideration. I Ic had also 
given the impression that lie was judiciall\ accepting the recommenda­
tion of the Law Revision Com mittee that certain promises should 
be enforceable even though not supported In consideration. The 
opportunity was at hand in the present ease to explain his true position, 
and this lie did with characteristic lucidity. In liis own words:
“ Much as I am inclined to favour the principle of the 
High Trees ease, it is important that it should not be 
stretched too far lest is should be endangered. It does not 
create new causes of action where none existed before. 
It only prevents a partx from insisting on his strict legal 
rights when it would be unjust to allow him to do so, 
having regard to the dealings which have taken place 
between the parties.”
Also Lord Justice Asquith said:
"It i-s unccessary to express any view as to the correctness of 
the decision in the High Trees ease, although I certainly 
must not be taken to be questioning it. 1 would, however, 
remark in passing that it seems to me a complete miscon­
ception to suppose that it struck at the roots of the doctrine 
of consideration.”
Perhaps the High I'rccs decision did not strike “at the roots 
of the doctrine of consideration,” but as interpreted by some it did 
give the doctrine a rather severe shaking. The Court of Appeal in the 
present case has attem pted, not necessarily to strengthen these tenacious 
roots of consideration, but at least to protect them. The decision 
is all the more noteworthy because Lord Justice Penning himself came 
to the defence of the doctrine. The result is that w;e have the principle 
of the High Trees ease still at our disposal, tempered by the proviso 
that it may only lx' used as a defence, and is not available as a causc 
of action.
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